PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit

PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit

Course modules

Course Documents
Course Documents 871259    
  • Syllabus Syllabus
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Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)
Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27) 871278    
  • Lecture 1 Slides Lecture 1 Slides
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  • Skyrms: Chapter 1 - Principles of Rational Decision Making Skyrms: Chapter 1 - Principles of Rational Decision Making
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  • K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists
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  • A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.) A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.)
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  • EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013 EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013
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Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)
Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3) 871280    
  • Lecture 2 Slides Lecture 2 Slides
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  • A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler
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  • Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games
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  • Reply by Harsanyi Reply by Harsanyi
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  • Rejoinder by Kadane and Larkey Rejoinder by Kadane and Larkey
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  • Reply by Harsanyi Reply by Harsanyi
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  • Additional Readings Additional Readings
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  • Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti
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  • Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen
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Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)
Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10) 871281    
  • Lecture 3 Slides Lecture 3 Slides
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  • J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge
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  • Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden
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  • What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game
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  • Additional Readings Additional Readings
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  • Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet
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  • The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden
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Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)
Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17) 871847    
  • Lecture 4 Slides Lecture 4 Slides
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  • Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann
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  • Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger
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  • Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg
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Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)
Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24) 871848    
  • Lecture 5 Slides Lecture 5 Slides
    must score at least a   scored at least a   must score no more than a   scored no more than a  must view the page viewed the page must contribute to the content of the page contributed to the content of the page must submit the assignment submitted the assignment
  • Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi
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  • Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz
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  • Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi
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  • Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce
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  • Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn
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No Class (3/3): Away at Conference
No Class (3/3): Away at Conference 898906    
Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)
Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10) 871865    
  • Lecture 6 Slides Lecture 6 Slides
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  • O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games
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  • A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin
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  • Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper
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  • Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper
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Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24) 901229    
  • Lecture 7 Slides Lecture 7 Slides
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  • Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria
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  • F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory
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  • J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory
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Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31) 902829    
  • Lecture 8 Slides Lecture 8 Slides
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  • J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation
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  • Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability
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Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)
Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7) 904885    
  • Lecture 9 Slides Lecture 9 Slides
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  • The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper
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  • K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability
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  • J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality
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  • Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)
Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14) 907083    
  • Lecture 10 Slides Lecture 10 Slides
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  • R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games
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  • Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson
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  • Reasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure Reasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure
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Backwards Induction (4/21)
Backwards Induction (4/21) 907087    
  • Lecture 11 Slides Lecture 11 Slides
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  • J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction
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  • R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction
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  • D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information
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Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)
Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28) 909581    
  • Lecture 12 Slides Lecture 12 Slides
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  • A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning
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  • J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept
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  • A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games
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  • Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence
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What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5)
What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5) 910852    
  • Lecture 13 Slides Lecture 13 Slides
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  • The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts by Kadane and Larkey The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts by Kadane and Larkey
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  • Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory by A. Rubinstein Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory by A. Rubinstein
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  • What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. Aumann What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. Aumann
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  • Counter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboa Counter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboa
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Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12)
Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12) 911068    
  • Lecture 14 Slides Lecture 14 Slides
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  • Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. Colman Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. Colman
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  • Models as Analogies by Gilboa et al. Models as Analogies by Gilboa et al.
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  • Mentalism vs. Behaviorism: A Philosophy of Science Perspective Mentalism vs. Behaviorism: A Philosophy of Science Perspective
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Final Problem Set (only for those not writing a paper)
Final Problem Set (only for those not writing a paper) 911889    
  • Problem Set Problem Set
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  • Additional Reading on Aumann Models Additional Reading on Aumann Models
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