PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit

PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit

Course modules

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Course Documents
   
done incomplete Syllabus Syllabus
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Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)
   
done incomplete Lecture 1 Slides Lecture 1 Slides
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done incomplete Skyrms, Chapter 1: Principles of Rational Decision Making Skyrms, Chapter 1: Principles of Rational Decision Making
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done incomplete K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists
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done incomplete A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.) A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.)
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done incomplete EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013 EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013
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Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)
   
done incomplete Lecture 2 Slides Lecture 2 Slides
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done incomplete A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler
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done incomplete Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games
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done incomplete Reply by Harsanyi Reply by Harsanyi
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done incomplete Rejoinder by Kadane and Larkey Rejoinder by Kadane and Larkey
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done incomplete Reply by Harsanyi Reply by Harsanyi
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done incomplete Additional Readings Additional Readings
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done incomplete Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti
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done incomplete Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen
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Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)
   
done incomplete Lecture 3 Slides Lecture 3 Slides
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done incomplete J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge
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done incomplete Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden
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done incomplete What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game
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done incomplete Additional Readings Additional Readings
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done incomplete Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet
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done incomplete The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden
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Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)
   
done incomplete Lecture 4 Slides Lecture 4 Slides
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done incomplete Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann
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done incomplete Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger
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done incomplete Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg
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Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)
   
done incomplete Lecture 5 Slides Lecture 5 Slides
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done incomplete Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi
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done incomplete Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz
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done incomplete Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi
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done incomplete Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce
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done incomplete Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn
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No Class (3/3): Away at Conference
   
Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)
   
done incomplete Lecture 6 Slides Lecture 6 Slides
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done incomplete O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games
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done incomplete A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin
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done incomplete Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper
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done incomplete Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper
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Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)
   
done incomplete Lecture 7 Slides Lecture 7 Slides
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done incomplete Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria
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done incomplete F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory
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done incomplete J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory
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Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)
   
done incomplete Lecture 8 Slides Lecture 8 Slides
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done incomplete J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation
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done incomplete Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability
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Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)
   
done incomplete Lecture 9 Slides Lecture 9 Slides
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done incomplete The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper
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done incomplete K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability
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done incomplete J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality
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done incomplete Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)
   
done incomplete R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games
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done incomplete Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson
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done incomplete Reasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure Reasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure
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Backwards Induction (4/21)
   
done incomplete J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction
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done incomplete R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction
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done incomplete D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information
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Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)
   
done incomplete A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning
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done incomplete J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept
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done incomplete A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games
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done incomplete Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence
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