PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit

PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit

Course Modules

Course Documents

Course Documents
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Course Documents 871259    
  • Syllabus
    Syllabus Syllabus
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Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)

Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27) 871278    
  • Lecture 1 Slides
    Lecture 1 Slides Lecture 1 Slides
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  • Skyrms: Chapter 1 - Principles of Rational Decision Making
    Skyrms: Chapter 1 - Principles of Rational Decision Making Skyrms: Chapter 1 - Principles of Rational Decision Making
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  • K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists
    K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.)
    A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.) A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.)
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  • EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013
    EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013 EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013
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Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)

Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3) 871280    
  • Lecture 2 Slides
    Lecture 2 Slides Lecture 2 Slides
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  • A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler
    A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler
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  • Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games
    Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games
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  • Reply by Harsanyi
    Reply by Harsanyi Reply by Harsanyi
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  • Rejoinder by Kadane and Larkey
    Rejoinder by Kadane and Larkey Rejoinder by Kadane and Larkey
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  • Reply by Harsanyi
    Reply by Harsanyi Reply by Harsanyi
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  • Additional Readings
    Additional Readings Additional Readings
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  • Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti
    Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen
    Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen
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Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)

Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10) 871281    
  • Lecture 3 Slides
    Lecture 3 Slides Lecture 3 Slides
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  • J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge
    J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden
    Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game
    What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game
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  • Additional Readings
    Additional Readings Additional Readings
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  • Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet
    Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden
    The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden
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Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)

Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17) 871847    
  • Lecture 4 Slides
    Lecture 4 Slides Lecture 4 Slides
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  • Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann
    Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann
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  • Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger
    Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger
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  • Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg
    Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg
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Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)

Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24) 871848    
  • Lecture 5 Slides
    Lecture 5 Slides Lecture 5 Slides
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  • Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi
    Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz
    Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz
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  • Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi
    Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi
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  • Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce
    Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce
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  • Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn
    Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn
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No Class (3/3): Away at Conference

No Class (3/3): Away at Conference
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
No Class (3/3): Away at Conference 898906    

Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)

Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10) 871865    
  • Lecture 6 Slides
    Lecture 6 Slides Lecture 6 Slides
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  • O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games
    O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin
    A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper
    Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper
    Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper
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Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)

Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24) 901229    
  • Lecture 7 Slides
    Lecture 7 Slides Lecture 7 Slides
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  • Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria
    Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory
    F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory
    J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)

Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31) 902829    
  • Lecture 8 Slides
    Lecture 8 Slides Lecture 8 Slides
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  • J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation
    J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability
    Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability
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Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)

Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7) 904885    
  • Lecture 9 Slides
    Lecture 9 Slides Lecture 9 Slides
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper
    The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability
    K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability
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  • J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality
    J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
    Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)

Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14) 907083    
  • Lecture 10 Slides
    Lecture 10 Slides Lecture 10 Slides
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games
    R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson
    Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson
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  • Reasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure
    Reasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure Reasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Backwards Induction (4/21)

Backwards Induction (4/21)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Backwards Induction (4/21) 907087    
  • Lecture 11 Slides
    Lecture 11 Slides Lecture 11 Slides
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction
    J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction
    R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information
    D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)

Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28) 909581    
  • Lecture 12 Slides
    Lecture 12 Slides Lecture 12 Slides
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning
    A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept
    J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games
    A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence
    Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5)

What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5) 910852    
  • Lecture 13 Slides
    Lecture 13 Slides Lecture 13 Slides
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts by Kadane and Larkey
    The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts by Kadane and Larkey The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts by Kadane and Larkey
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory by A. Rubinstein
    Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory by A. Rubinstein Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory by A. Rubinstein
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. Aumann
    What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. Aumann What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. Aumann
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Counter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboa
    Counter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboa Counter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboa
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Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12)

Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12) 911068    
  • Lecture 14 Slides
    Lecture 14 Slides Lecture 14 Slides
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  • Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. Colman
    Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. Colman Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. Colman
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  • Models as Analogies by Gilboa et al.
    Models as Analogies by Gilboa et al. Models as Analogies by Gilboa et al.
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  • Mentalism vs. Behaviorism: A Philosophy of Science Perspective
    Mentalism vs. Behaviorism: A Philosophy of Science Perspective Mentalism vs. Behaviorism: A Philosophy of Science Perspective
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Final Problem Set (only for those not writing a paper)

Final Problem Set (only for those not writing a paper)
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Final Problem Set (only for those not writing a paper) 911889    
  • Problem Set
    Problem Set Problem Set
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  • Additional Reading on Aumann Models
    Additional Reading on Aumann Models Additional Reading on Aumann Models
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